Case Law Details
T.A.M.Athavan Vs Commissioner of Customs (Madras High Court)
The Madras High Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by T.A.M. Athavan against the Commissioner of Customs, affirming an earlier decision by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) which held that the petitioner lacked the necessary standing to file an appeal. The court’s judgment reinforces the principle that only parties directly aggrieved by an order can challenge it before an appellate authority.
The case originated from a complaint lodged by Mr. Athavan against a Customs House Agent (second respondent) concerning alleged forgery of shipping bills. Following an investigation based on this complaint, the Commissioner of Customs (Seaport – Import) issued an order on August 28, 2009. This order, while acknowledging the complaint, absolved the second respondent but issued a “severe warning.”
Aggrieved by this outcome, Mr. Athavan appealed to the CESTAT, Chennai. However, the Tribunal dismissed his appeal on August 14, 2024, on the grounds that he was not a party to the original proceedings and therefore could not be considered an “aggrieved person” eligible to file an appeal. The Tribunal specifically noted that Mr. Athavan was not even a co-noticee in the customs adjudication. It concluded that merely initiating an investigation based on his complaint did not confer upon him the right to challenge the final order.
Mr. Athavan subsequently filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court, challenging the CESTAT’s decision. His counsel argued that he was not afforded an opportunity to present his case before the Appellate Tribunal.
Justice Abdul Quddhoose, in delivering the judgment, observed that the petitioner was not a party to the original proceedings and no adverse order had been passed against him by the Commissioner of Customs. The court concurred with the CESTAT’s finding that Mr. Athavan had no locus standi, stating that “there is no infirmity in the findings of the Appellate Tribunal.” The court further held that even if an opportunity were granted, the outcome would likely remain the same, deeming a remand to the Tribunal as serving no useful purpose.
The High Court also noted that the petitioner’s complaint did not specify the provisions of the Customs Act under which the allegations of forgery were made. The court pointed out that the dispute between Mr. Athavan and the second respondent appeared to stem from a personal rivalry, as they were relatives.
The judgment emphasized that the Customs Act is primarily legislated to prevent violations of its provisions. In this instance, since the original authority had acted upon the complaint and passed an order, albeit one that the petitioner found unsatisfactory, the appropriate course of action for Mr. Athavan was to pursue remedies outside the customs adjudication framework.
The court clarified that if Mr. Athavan believed he was genuinely wronged by the alleged forgery or suffered reputational damage, his recourse lay in lodging a criminal complaint against the second respondent and its representatives or filing a civil suit seeking damages. The court explicitly granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue such avenues.
This ruling by the Madras High Court underscores a critical aspect of administrative law: the requirement for a direct interest and demonstrable grievance to invoke appellate jurisdiction. It highlights that the role of a complainant, while crucial in initiating an investigation, does not automatically confer the status of an “aggrieved person” for the purpose of appealing the final decision, particularly when that decision does not directly impact their rights or impose any liability upon them.
The judgment did not cite specific judicial precedents within the text, however, the principles applied align with established legal doctrines on locus standi, which generally require a party to demonstrate a direct and substantial injury or prejudice to have the right to seek a remedy from a court or tribunal. The court’s decision effectively reinforces the procedural boundaries within the customs adjudication and appellate framework.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
This writ petition has been filed, challenging the impugned order dated 14.08.2024 passed by the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal in Customs Appeal No.40745 of 2015.
2. Under the impugned order, the Appellate Tribunal has dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner on the ground that the appellant is not a party to the proceedings and he cannot be considered as an aggrieved person to file an appeal before the Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal has also observed, while dismissing the appeal that the petitioner is not even a co-noticee. The Appellate Tribunal has also observed that merely because investigation was initiated based on the complaint given by the petitioner, it cannot be said that the petitioner is a person aggrieved by the order of the Original Authority. By giving the aforesaid findings, the Appellate Tribunal has held that the appellant has got no locus standi to file the appeal. Based on a complaint lodged by the petitioner against the second respondent with regard to the alleged forgery committed by the second respondent in respect of the shipping bills, the complaint was investigated and an order in original dated 28.08.2009 came to be passed by the Commissioner of Customs, (Seaport – Import) absolving the second respondent (Customs House Agent) by letting off the second respondent with severe warning. While lodging the complaint against the second respondent for the alleged forgery of shipping bills, the petitioner in his complaint has not stated under what provisions of the Customs Act, the complaint was lodged against the second respondent (Customs House Agent).
3. Admittedly, the petitioner and the persons managing the second respondent’s affairs are relatives and they have some personal rivalry amongst themselves. The Customs Act has been legislated only to prevent any violation of the provisions of the Customs Act.
4. In the case on hand, as seen from the complaint that too, when the original authority while passing the order in original, has let off the second respondent with severe warning, after acting upon the complaint given by the petitioner, the remedy if at all available to the petitioner is to lodge a criminal complaint against the second respondent and its representatives for the alleged forgery of the shipping bills or to file a civil suit seeking for damages for causing disrepute to the petitioner’s reputation in the manner known to the petitioner under law. Aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Customs (Sea Port – Import) (Order in original) dated 28.08.2009, the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Chennai. While dismissing the appeal, the Appellate Tribunal has rightly held that when the appellant (petitioner herein) is not a party to the proceedings, he cannot be considered as an aggrieved person to file an appeal before the Tribunal.
5. Admittedly, the petitioner herein is not a party to the original proceedings and he is not even a co-noticee. Admittedly, no adverse order has been passed against the petitioner in the original proceedings, namely, the order in original dated 28.08.2009 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Sea Port – Import). The Appellate Tribunal in the impugned order has rightly held that merely because investigation was initiated on the basis of the petitioner’s complaint, it cannot be considered that the petitioner is aggrieved by such an order and has come to the right conclusion that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the appeal. There is no infirmity in the findings of the Appellate Tribunal.
6. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that he was not granted an opportunity to represent his case before the Appellate Tribunal, this Court is of the considered view that even if an opportunity is given, the same conclusion as rendered by the Appellate Tribunal will have to follow. No useful purpose will be served if the matter is remanded back to the Appellate Tribunal and therefore, the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be rejected.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner is also unable to point out to this Court as to what provisions under the Customs Act, the complaint was lodged against the second respondent. When the Commissioner of Customs (Sea Port – Import) in his order in original dated 28.08.2009, after giving due consideration to the findings of the investigation, passed an order letting off the second respondent (Customs House Agent) with severe warning and the petitioner, who is not a party to the said proceedings, the question of interfering with the order of the Appellate Tribunal by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not arise.
8. This Court does not find any infirmity in the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed. If the petitioner is aggrieved by the conduct of the second respondent and its partners/representatives, he has to redresses his grievance either by lodging a criminal complaint or through the Civil Court against them and liberty is granted for the petitioner to file the same. No costs.
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